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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL KEVIN FISHER, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20030996-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the sentence and commitment imposed by the Fifth District 
Court in three separate cases involving seven separate felony counts and three misdemeanors. 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue I: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive 
sentences? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the sentencing decisions of a trial court for 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Hammond, 2001 UT 92, \ 8, 34 P.3d 773. 
Issue II: In the alternative, was it plain error for Judge Shumate to recuse himself 
from sentencing? 
Standard of Review: "[T]o establish the existence of plain error and to obtain 
appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must 
show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following items are contained in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 - Concurrent or Consecutive Sentences 
Canon 3 of Utah's Code of Judicial Conduct 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant was charged by Information with numerous counts in three separate cases. 
On April 25,2003, he entered pleas in all three cases (R. 105:5-12).2 In case no. 021501200 
he pled guilty to illegal possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 65-68 & 105:5). In case no. 
0315001609 he pled "no contest" to burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, and 
theft, a second degree felony (R. 37-^3 & 105:9-10). In case no. 031500167, he pled guilty 
to burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, possession of a weapon by a restricted 
1
 The facts of the underlying crimes are not included because they not relevant to 
this appeal, since the appeal only involves sentencing issues. 
2
 For convenience, when citing to a transcript or the record, defendant referred to 
the record in case no. 031500169. The State will do the same, unless otherwise noted. 
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person, a third degree felony, failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree 
felony, possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, and manufacture or possession of burglary 
instruments, a class B misdemeanor (R. 41-48 & 105:6-9). 
The State agreed to recommend that the pleas be held in abeyance for a maximum of 
36 months on the conditions that defendant successfully complete the Washington County 
Drug Court Program, and the Horizon House program. The State also agreed to recommend 
work release so that defendant could earn money to pay for those programs (105:3-4). The 
Court held all of the pleas in abeyance, ordered that defendant be immediately released for 
work release, and scheduled the cases for drug court (R. 105:11). 
While defendant was on work release he "got high" (used drugs) in the work release 
trailer and did not return to jail (R. 121:5, 10). In response to this violation of the plea 
agreement, the State filed a motion for an order to show cause (R. 51). A hearing was held 
on June 19,2003 (R. 121). Defendant testified at the hearing and admitted that he used drugs 
in the work release trailer and then did not return (R. 121:10-11). 
Judge Shumate asked defendant who brought the drugs into the work release trailer 
(R. 121:11). Defendant did not want to disclose the name. The Judge advised defendant that 
he had discretion to impose his sentences consecutively or concurrently and that defendant 
had to "decide what's more important to you." Id. Defendant conferred with his counsel off 
the record. There was then a discussion at the bench off the record (R. 121:12). In his brief, 
defendant asserts that he gave the judge the name of the person who brought the drugs into 
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the facility (def.'s brief at 10). However, the name was not stated on the record. At 
sentencing, defendant's counsel asserted that defendant had disclosed the name, but again, 
the name was not stated on the record, and what had previously been said off the record was 
not placed on the record (R. 144:6). 
Following the show cause hearing, the court found that the pleas in abeyance had been 
violated, therefore the pleas were entered (R. 121:14). Sentencing was scheduled for July 
30, 2003 (R. 121:14-15). On June 23, 2003, defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss 
counsel (R. 60-67). A hearing was held on the motion to dismiss (R. 122). At that hearing, 
Judge Shumate recused himself from the cases, stating that he had spoken with the deputy 
chair of the parole board regarding Mr. Fisher's case, and because of that contact, and his 
drug court involvement, he did not think he should be the sentencing judge (R. 70,122:3-4). 
The cases were reassigned to Judge Beacham and sentencing was rescheduled. Id. 
Defense counsel told Judge Beacham that Judge Shumate "implied" and "gave a 
strong indication" that if defendant cooperated, his sentences would be concurrent (R. 
123:14-15). Judge Beacham initially declined to impose sentence and returned the cases to 
Judge Shumate (R. 123:16). At a hearing before Judge Shumate, trial counsel asked that 
Judge Shumate's recusal be withdrawn. The request was denied (R. 108:5). When the 
conversation at the show cause hearing was discussed, Judge Shumate stated that he did not 
see his statements to defendant as binding as to what his sentence would be (R. 108:4). 
Judge Shumate reaffirmed his recusal from all of defendant's matters and the cases were 
referred back to Judge Beacham for sentencing (R. 82). 
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Judge Beacham imposed sentence on September 11,2003 (R. 97 and 138). Defendant 
was sentenced on ten counts in three separate cases. To summarize, most of the sentences 
for offenses within each case were concurrent, but the sentences in each case were 
consecutive to the sentences in the other cases. For example, in case no. 031500169, 
defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years for burglary and 1 to 15 years for theft. The 
sentences were to run concurrently to each other but consecutively with the sentences in case 
nos. 021501200 and 031500167 (R. 87 and 138:12-14).3 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 10, 2003 (R. 92). 
3
 In case no. 031500169 defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years for burglary and 
1 to 15 years for theft. The sentences were to run concurrently to each other but 
consecutively with the sentences in case nos. 021501200 and 031500167 (R. 87 and 
138:12-14). 
In case no. 021501200, defendant was sentenced to 0 to 5 years for possession of a 
controlled substance and 6 months for possession of drug paraphernalia, the terms to be 
served concurrently (R. 101 in case 021501200). 
In case no. 031500167, defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years for burglary, 
concurrent with count 4 and consecutive to the sentence in case 021500120; 0 to 5 years 
for failure to respond to officer's signal to stop, concurrent with counts 3, 5 and 6 and 
consecutive to counts 1 and 4; 0 to 5 years for possession of a controlled substance, 
concurrent with count 1 and consecutive to the sentence in case 021501200; 0 to 5 years 
for possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, concurrent with all other 
sentences and consecutive to the sentence in case 021501200; up to 6 months for 
possession of drug paraphernalia, concurrent with all other sentences; and up to 6 months 
for manufacture or possession of instrument for burglary or theft, concurrent with all 
other sentences (R. 123-24 in case 031500167). 
Defendant was originally incorrectly sentenced for aggravated assault and not for 
possession of a dangerous weapon of a restricted person (R. 101). On April 1, 2004, the 
trial court entered an Order to Amend Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, ordering 
that the judgement be amended to include possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person in place of aggravated assault (R. 120). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. It was proper for 
the court to consider whether defendant cooperated by naming the person who brought drugs 
into the facility, and to advise defendant that his cooperation, or lack of cooperation, could 
affect the court's decision to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. However, there 
was no agreement that defendant would receive concurrent sentences if he disclosed the 
name. Judge Shumate did not abuse his discretion by recusing himself from defendant's 
cases. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 
consecutive sentences because he claims there was an agreement that he would be sentenced 
concurrently (def.'s brief at 13). Defendant also argues that "Judge Shumate abused his 
discretion for recusing himself from the cases and Judge Beacham abused his discretion for 
not honoring the sentencing agreement between Judge Shumate and Fisher" (def.'s brief at 
18). Defendant's arguments fail because there was no "agreement" that defendant would be 
given concurrent sentences. Judge Beacham did not abuse his discretion in imposing 
consecutive sentences and Judge Shumate did not abuse his discretion in recusing himself. 
"The sentencing judge 'has broad discretion in imposing [a] sentence within the 
statutory scope provided by the legislature.'" State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, % 3, 73 
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P.3d991 (quoting Statev. Rhodes, 818P.2d 1048,1051 (Utah App. 1991)). This Court "will 
not overturn a sentence unless it exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed 
to consider 'all the legally relevant factors,5 State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 
App. 1997), or 'the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of 
discretion.' Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051." Id An '"appellate court can properly find abuse [of 
discretion] only if it can be said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by 
the trial court.'" State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, \ 6, 82 P.3d 211. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (West 2004) gives the court discretion to impose 
concurrent or consecutive sentences "if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense." Abuse of discretion may be manifest if the judge's actions were 
inherently unfair, if the judge failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence 
imposed was clearly excessive. State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996). 
Appellate courts will set aside a sentence "if the sentence represents an abuse of 
discretion, if the trial judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence 
imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law." State v. Gentlewind, 844 P.2d 372,375 (Utah 
App. 1992) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989)). "An abuse of 
discretion occurs only when it is clear that the actions of the judge were inherently unfair." 
Id. (citations omitted). "An appellate court may only find abuse if it can be said that no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Montoya, 929 
P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
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At the hearing concerning violation of the pleas in abeyance, defendant took the stand 
and testified. The following exchange occurred where Judge Shumate asked defendant to 
disclose the name of the person who brought in the drugs. 
THE WITNESS: 
THE COURT: 
THE WITNESS: 
THE COURT: 
THE WITNESS: 
THE COURT: 
THE WITNESS: 
THE COURT: 
THE WITNESS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MYERS: 
THE COURT: 
THE COURT: 
I got high inside the facility. 
Who brought it in, Mr. Fisher? 
I don't want to disclose that right now. 
You don't have an option. Who brought it in? 
I didn't bring it in. 
I didn't ask if you did, I said who brought it in? 
I don't want to disclose that, your Honor. I'm facing too 
much time in prison right now to put myself in those 
shoes. 
And that's exactly the reason you need to disclose it, Mr. 
Fisher. I have got three felony matters here. They can be 
served consecutively or concurrently at my discretion. 
You've got to decide what's more import to you. 
Is there anyway I could talk with my attorney for a few 
minutes? 
Absolutely, please. Counsel, will you approach so you 
can consult with Mr. Fisher? 
(Mr. Fisher confers with his Counsel) 
May we approach? 
Certainly, Counsel. 
(Discussion at the bench off the record) 
All right, thank you, Mr. Fisher, that was artfully 
handled. Go ahead, Mr. Myers. 
(R. 121:11-12). 
Defendant argues that once he "received this assurance that he would be sentenced 
concurrently instead of consecutively, he disclosed to Judge Shumate the person responsible 
for bringing the drugs into the facility" (def.'s brief at 15). However, defendant was never 
assured that he would be sentenced concurrently instead of consecutively. The Court merely 
accurately advised defendant that his sentences could be served consecutively or concurrently 
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at the Court's discretion. At most, the Court was advising defendant that his cooperation 
would be a factor considered at sentencing. 
Defendant took time to confer with his counsel. There is no evidence in the record 
to tell us what conversation took place between defendant and his counsel. "Absent a record, 
this Court presumes regularity in the proceedings below." State v. Eloge, 762 P.2d 1,2 (Utah 
1988); and see State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, fl3,69 P.3d 1278 ("When crucial matters are 
not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial 
court." (cite omitted)). Since the conversation with counsel is not part of the record, this 
Court must presume that counsel accurately advised defendant. Presumably counsel advised 
defendant that the Judge had the power to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences and 
that cooperating by giving the name of the person who brought in the drugs might cause the 
judge to lean more favorably towards imposing concurrent sentences. However, there was 
no guarantee, and the judge had not promised that if defendant gave the name, he would 
impose concurrent sentences. 
After defendant conferred with his counsel, a discussion was held at the bench off the 
record (R. 121:12). There is no evidence in the record to establish what was said at this off-
the-record discussion. Since there is no record of the off-the-record conversation with the 
Judge, this Court must "presume the regularity of the proceedings." Id. Defendant asserts 
that he disclosed to Judge Shumate the name of the person responsible for bringing the drugs 
into the facility (brief at 15). For purposes of this argument, the State assumes that defendant 
disclosed to the court the name of the person who brought drugs into the facility. 
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It was not improper for Judge Shumate to ask defendant to cooperate by disclosing 
the name of the person who brought in the drugs. The court properly advised defendant that 
it had discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. Advice on the possible 
sentencing benefits of cooperation is not improper. 
In Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 561, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1364-65 (1980), the 
defendant was told "that the extent of [his] cooperation could be expected to affect his 
sentence." The United States Supreme Court held that the district court properly considered, 
as one factor in imposing consecutive sentences, defendant's refusal to cooperate. Id., see 
also United States v. Gallego, 943 F.Supp. 343, 346 (S.D.N. Y. 1995) (federal rules allow 
consideration of defendant's cooperation or failure to cooperate "in determining where 
within the guideline range the defendant should be sentenced"). 
"[I]t is entirely proper for a trial court to consider on sentencing, the defendant's 
cooperativeness as manifested by his refusal to name his accomplices." State v. Kaczynski, 
258 Wis.2d 653, 660,654 N.W.2d 300, 304 (2002); of. United States v. Figueroa, 1999 WL 
33292465 (D. Utah) ("Advice on the sentencing benefit as to acceptance of responsibility is 
not improper") (copy attached as addendum B). 
When this case first came before Judge Beacham for sentencing, the Judge asked: 
"Now what possible reason is there for concurrent sentences?" (R. 123:11). The Judge then 
listened to defense counsel's arguments for concurrent sentencing, which included the prior 
conversation with Judge Shumate at the show cause hearing. Defense counsel said: 
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The second reason is is [sic] Judge Shumate, when we had this order to 
show cause as to why his probation should not be revoked for testing positive 
while he was on work release from what an inmates [sic] brought it into the 
facility, the judge said, "Well, I can run these concurrent or I can run them 
consecutive" and so that's why he was questioning Mr. Fisher for information 
which he gave to him, and everyone - - he gave it to him. Everyone agreed it 
was correct information, and so under that pressure or direction from the Court 
that concurrent sentences would be given, that's the second reason why 
concurrent sentence. 
(R. 123:12). 
Judge Beacham said: "Well, I can't rely on things I don't know about, things I didn't 
say, things I didn't participate in. I have to just rely on what the record shows." (R. 123:13). 
Defense counsel later said: "Judge Shumate gave a strong indication it's going to be run 
concurrent if Mr. Fisher cooperated. He did. Prosecution all admitted that he cooperated, 
gave him - - you know, the correct information, what he gave." (R. 123:14). Judge Beacham 
then asked, "Well, now Counsel, are you suggesting that I made some kind of commitments 
aboutthis?" (R. 123:15). Counsel said "No." Judge Beacham then said: "But you are saying 
that Mr. Fisher in your expectation was for concurrent sentences?" Defense counsel then 
said that was what Judge Shumate implied. Id. (emphasis added). 
Judge Shumate implied — Mr. Fisher did not want to give any 
information. He said he didn't want to, "I'm not going to" you know. Judge 
Shumate said, "Mr. Fisher, I can have these charges run concurrent or 
consecutive." So with that said, then Mr. Fisher cooperated and then everyone 
agreed that yes, the information he gave was correct and accurate. 
(R. 123:15). 
Judge Beacham initially declined to impose sentence and returned the cases to Judge 
Shumate. After the cases were returned to Judge Shumate, at a hearing on September 3, 
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2003, Judge Shumate stated that he did not view his statements to defendant as binding as 
to what sentence would be imposed. 
[Y]our counsel have represented to this court, and as an officer to this 
court, his representations are given substantial weight, that there was a point 
when you indicated to the court the source of the medication or chemicals that 
came into the jail after the court had reminded you that I can impose either 
consecutive or concurrent sentences. I have no reason to disbelieve Mr. 
Myers' statement at all. However, I did not see that statement to you as 
binding under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as to what 
your sentence would or would not be. 
(R. 108:4). 
Judge Shumate affirmed his recusal and the cases were returned to Judge Beacham 
for sentencing (R. 108:4). Legally valid and appropriate sentences were imposed. There was 
no binding agreement that defendant would receive concurrent sentences if he provided the 
name of the person who brought in the drugs. Even defense counsel could only claim that 
Judge Shumate "strongly indicated" and "implied" that defendant would receive concurrent 
sentences (R. 123:14-15). There was no promise or guarantee or binding agreement that 
concurrent sentences would be imposed. Therefore Judge Beacham did not abuse his 
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences and Judge Shumate did not abuse his discretion 
by recusing himself prior to sentencing.4 
At sentencing, Judge Beacham noted that he had referred the cases back to Judge 
Shumate. He then said: "I see (inaudible) has reviewed the case and reaffirmed his recusal, 
if you will. I have also spoken to Judge Shumate in the meantime about the circumstances, 
4
 This issue is addressed more fully in section II below. 
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telling him why I was sending it back to him. Primarily (inaudible). I have consulted with 
him on that. So the way I understand it is that the cases are here for sentencing today" (R. 
138:3). 
Defense counsel advised the court that he had obtained a copy of the hearing where 
he made reference to Judge Shumate's comments. There was then a sidebar conference, and 
then an off-the-record discussion took place (R. 138:3-4). Prior to imposing sentence, Judge 
Beacham stated some of his reasons for the sentences imposed: 
Mr. Fisher is before the court for sentencing with a list of felony 
convictions that were more than enough for any one lifetime, but they are not 
the only ones he has. 
Mr. Fisher, at the very foundation of all of this, is a hopelessly 
committed drug addict. He has at least a 12 year period of heavy drug use. 
And so far as I am able to tell, never spent a great deal of effort (inaudible) 
about that. (Inaudible). 
Mr. Fisher, I'm going to, for whatever mitigation there is, to attribute 
it to the fact that he is a [sic] admitted drug addict, has (inaudible) for the court 
at all. Mr. Fisher has lied directly to me. No amount of shaving the facts, Mr. 
Fisher, is going to change that. It's a question of whether I'm going to believe 
you or my own eyes and ears. And I believe my own eyes and ears. 
Mr. Fisher, I don't think, can be believed on anything. He has for more 
than 10 years been involved in stealing property, burglaries, and now has 
victimized this community to the tune of seven new felonies, eight counting 
that last case. And that is the recipe for a long prison commitment. 
(R. 138:11-12). 
Judge Beacham then imposed sentence (R. 138:12-14). As recited above in the 
Statement of the Case, some of the sentences were concurrent and some were consecutive. 
Judge Beacham said: "There is a reason for doing that. I want that a matter of record. 
Committing burglary is one thing. Being under the influence of meth is another thing. And 
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possession of a firearm is another thing. And then failing to respond to the officer's signal 
to stop and taking the officers on a high speed chase is entirely different and further 
aggravation. You simply don't get to do all of those in one incident and get one sentence out 
of it (R. 138:13). 
Under the facts and circumstances of defendant's cases, it cannot be said that "no 
reasonable person" would impose the sentence imposed by the trial court. Corbitt, 2003 UT 
App 417, Tf 6. Although defendant was asked to cooperate and was advised that the court 
could impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, no promise was made and defendant was 
not guaranteed that he would receive concurrent sentences if he named the person 
responsible for bringing in the drugs. No abuse of discretion occurred during sentencing in 
this case. The judge considered all legally relevant factors, and the sentence imposed was 
appropriate. Defendant is therefore not entitled to appellate relief. 
II. JUDGE SHUMATE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BY 
RECUSING HIMSELF PRIOR TO SENTENCING, AND HIS 
RECUSAL WAS ALSO NOT PLAIN ERROR. 
Defendant argues that Judge Shumate abused his discretion by recusing himself. 
However, defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that Judge Shumate 
erroneously recused himself.5 Therefore, defendant argues that it was plain error for Judge 
Shumate to recuse himself from these cases at the time and in the manner he chose to do so 
(def.'sbriefatl9). 
5
 Trial counsel requested that Judge Shumate reconsider his recusal (R. 108:5). 
However, trial counsel failed to file any written objection to the recusal and failed to 
argue below that the recusal was erroneous or an abuse of discretion. 
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To establish plain error, a defendant must show that '"(i) an error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant.'" State 
v. Tueller, 2001 UTApp. 31749,37P.3d 1180, (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-
09 (Utah 1993)). 
A. Defendant has no right to be sentenced by Judge 
Shumate 
A defendant is entitled to fair sentencing by a fair and impartial judge. "Judges are 
by definition assumed competent and obligated to follow the law." Taylor v. Warden, 905 
P.2d 277, 284 (Utah 1995). The Utah Constitution, Article 1, section 7 states that "[n]o 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." "One of 
the fundamental principles of due process is that all parties to a case are entitled to an 
unbiased, impartial judge." Anderson v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 
(Utah 1985). 
However, a defendant is not entitled to demand a particular judge to impose his 
sentence. "While it is preferable that the judge who takes a defendant's plea be the same as 
the judge who sentences that defendant, it is not essential that they be the same." See State 
v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1979). A defendant does not have the right to request 
that the judge of his choice impose his sentence. Cf. Caplin &Drysdale} Chartered v. United 
States, 491 U.S. 617, 624, 109 S.Ct. 2646 (1989) ("Petitioner does not, nor could it 
defensibly do so, assert that impecunious defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to 
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choose their counsel."); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1610 (1983) (indigent 
defendant does not have right to appointment of counsel of his own choosing); State v. Ford, 
793 P.2d 397, 403 (Utah App. 1990) ("defendant does not have the right to delay trial while 
he searches in vain for an attorney who agrees with his views" (referring to United States v. 
Weninger, 624 F.2d 163,166 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980)); State v. Baker, 
935 P.2d 503,505 (Utah 1997) (defendant is entitled to an impartial jury, but not to the "most 
favorable" jury); State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35,136, 24 P.3d 948 (defendant is entitled to "a 
fair and impartial jury," but any claim that jury was not impartial must focus not on juror 
removed with peremptory challenge, but on the jury ultimately seated). 
A defendant has a right to fair sentencing. However, a defendant has no specific right 
to be sentenced by the Judge of his choosing. It was not plain error for Judge Shumate to 
recuse himself because defendant had no right to be sentenced by Judge Shumate, even if he 
hoped Judge Shumate would have imposed concurrent sentences. 
B. The purpose of recusal 
The purpose of recusal is to ensure that a defendant has a fair and impartial judge. A 
judge should recuse himself if he cannot be impartial or if his impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned. Canon 3 of Utah's Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge "shall enter 
a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned." (addendum A); see also In re Inquiry concerning a Judge, 2003 UT 35,^5,81 
P.3d758. 
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Judge Shumate stated that he had spoken with the deputy chair of the parole board 
regarding Mr. Fisher's case, and that because of that contact, and his drug court involvement, 
he did not think he should be the sentencing judge (R. 122:3-4). 
There is no categorical rule that whenever a judge engages in an ex parte 
conversation, he is deemed to be partial, biased, or prejudiced, such that disqualification is 
required under Canon 3. See In re Young, 1999 UT 81, ^ 34-36, 984 P.2d 997. However, 
Judge Shumate apparently believed that because of his conversation with members of the 
Board of Pardons, it would be best if he recused himself from defendant's cases. 
Defendant argues that "[o]nce Judge Shumate entered into the agreement with Fisher, 
it was an abuse of discretion to enter a recusal from the cases and not impose sentencing as 
agreed upon" (def.'s brief at 20). However, as argued above, there was never any agreement 
that concurrent sentences would be imposed. 
C. The recusal in this case 
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss counsel (R. 60-67). A 
hearing was held on the matter (R. 122). After hearing from defendant, Judge Shumate 
recused himself from the case, stating that it was the best way to make sure that everything 
was done fairly for the defendant. 
Do you know what I'm going to do, Mr. Fisher? I'm going to do it this 
way. I'm going to recuse myself from your cases, and I'll tell you why. I'll 
put it on the record now. Ordinarily I don't do this, but I think the record 
needs to know. 
Mr. Fisher, at the most recent district judges conference, I actually 
spoke with the deputy chair of the board regarding your case just before you 
were admitted to drug court and before you came into these violations. I was 
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aware at that time that the board was apparently very, very reluctant to place 
you into drug court, and only did it after some pressure from the agents of 
Adult Probation and Parole who were serving as your advocates, basically. 
Now because of the consequences that you face and the contact that I 
have had because of the drug court involvement and your violation of the drug 
court rules, as it appears to his Court, I don't think I should be the judge 
determining whether or not you should have to go to prison for a zero to five 
or a one to fifteen or anything. I think we better give you a judge who has 
basically a clean slate, doesn't understand much about you, and so I'm going 
to recuse on it. 
* * * 
Mr. Fisher, that's the best way we can make sure that everything is done 
fairly for you, sir. We'll get you started with a brand new judge and look at 
things there. All right. Thank you, gentlemen. 
(R. 122:3-4). 
Judge Shumate later re-affirmed his recusal and the reasons for his recusal. 
The reason I want to make a record on this matter today is to remind 
everyone that this judge, myself, James L. Shumate, has recused because I 
have become too involved in the circumstances to give a reasonable sentence 
that is free of prejudgment or anything else because of our history and the fact 
that I actually spoke to members of the Board of Pardons regarding your 
circumstance. Because of that, it is not appropriate for me to rule on your 
sentence at all. And it now can go back to Judge Beacham for his review. 
(R. 108:4). 
Defendant argues that "it was plain error for Judge Shumate to recuse himself from 
the cases at the time, and in the manner, he chose to do so." (def.'s brief at 19). However, 
even if Judge Shumate was not required to recuse himself, it was not plain error to recuse 
himself. Defendant cites no rules, statutes, case law, or any other legal authority to support 
his argument that it was plain error for Judge Shumate to recuse himself. Even if Judge 
Shumate was not required to recuse himself, it is not error for a judge to recuse himself in 
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an excess of caution. Numerous cases can be found which discuss whether a judge 
improperly failed to recuse himself. However, no case law could be found discussing 
whether it could ever be error for a judge to unnecessarily recuse himself. Even if it was 
error, defendant has failed to establish that the error was obvious, or that the error was 
harmful. 
The only real question is whether defendant received fair sentencing, no matter which 
judge imposed sentence. If defendant received fair sentencing, then any error in recusal 
could not be harmful. As addressed above, defendant received fair sentencing and the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. If a promise or guarantee had been 
made to the defendant that he would receive concurrent sentences if he named the person 
who brought in the drugs, then the court (regardless of which judge imposed sentence) may 
have been bound by that promise. However no such promise was made. 
Judge Shumate stated on the record that he did not view his statements as binding as 
to what defendant's sentence would be (R. 108:4). Judge Beacham was fully advised as to 
the conversation that occurred between Judge Shumate and the defendant. Judge Beacham 
obviously also did not view the court's statements as a binding agreement that the defendant 
would receive concurrent sentences. 
Even if it were error for Judge Shumate to recuse himself, defendant cannot establish 
that the error was harmful, because he cannot establish that absent recusal, there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. Defendant's apparent belief that he 
would have received concurrent sentences if he had been sentenced by Judge Shumate is not 
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supported by the record and cannot simply be presumed. Judge Shumate specifically stated 
on the record that he did not view his statements to the defendant as binding as to what 
sentence would be imposed (R. 108:4). Defendant cannot establish that he would have 
received a more favorable sentence even if he had been sentenced by Judge Shumate. He 
therefore cannot establish plain error. 
Judge Shumate did not abuse his discretion by recusing himself from defendant's 
cases. In addition, Judge Shumate's recusal does not qualify as plain error because there was 
no error. Even if Judge Shumate was not required to recuse himself, an unnecessary recusal, 
done out of an excess of caution, does not qualify as error. Even if any error occurred, 
defendant has failed to establish that the error was harmful. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments set forth above, the State asks this Court to affirm the 
sentence imposed on defendant Fisher. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £L day of May, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ERIN RILEY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY>GENERAL 
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UT ST § 7 6-3-401 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-401 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*1 Chapter 3. Punishments 
*! Part 4. Limitations and Special Provisions on Sentences 
-•§ 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the 
offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of 
judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each 
other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively 
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would 
be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court 
shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to 
run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 7 6-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
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(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which 
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present 
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the 
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial 
sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6) (a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a 
single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as 
follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with 
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the 
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served 
under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not 
been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where 
the person is located. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; 
Laws 1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 
283, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, 
c. 129, § 1, eff. July 1, 2002. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://print. westlaw.com/delivery .html?dest=atp&format=HTMLE&dataid=B005580000... 05/25/2005 
Page 4 of 5 
UT ST § 76-3-401 Page 3 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-401 
Laws 2002, c. 129, substantially rewrote this section that formerly provided: 
"(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the 
offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court 
states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
"(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would 
be inappropriate. 
"(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences shall 
run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole has reason 
to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was imprisoned or on 
parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request clarification from the 
court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter an amended order of 
commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
"(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
"(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
"(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
"(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
"(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty 
or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
"(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which 
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
"(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
"(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
"(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
" (c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present 
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the 
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial 
sentencing by any other court. 
"(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6) (a) applies, determining the effect of 
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consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a 
single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison 
terms as follows: 
" (a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
" (b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
"(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with 
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser sentence shall 
merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the 
sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence with the 
most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
"(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served 
under the commitments. 
"(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
"(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not 
been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where 
the person is located." 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-401, UT ST § 76-3-401 
Current through Nov. 2, 2004 general election. 
© 2005 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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C 
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rn Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
*i Chapter 12. Code of Judicial Conduct 
-•CANON 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently 
A. Judicial Duties in General. The judicial duties of a full-time judge take precedence over all the judge's other 
activities. The judge's judicial duties include all the duties of the judge's office prescribed by law. In the 
performance of these duties, the following standards apply. 
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required or 
permitted by rule, or transfer to another court occurs. 
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan 
interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before the judge. 
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom 
the judge deals in an official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, 
and others subject to judicial direction and control. 
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of 
judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based 
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and should not 
permit, and shall use all reasonable efforts to deter, staff, court officials and others subject to judicial direction and 
control from doing so. A judge should be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial. 
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by words or 
conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or 
socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. This Canon does not preclude legitimate 
advocacy when race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, or 
other similar factors, are issues in the proceeding. 
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right 
to be heard according to law. Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and shall 
discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding. A judge may 
consult with the court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative 
responsibilities or with other judges provided that the judge does not abrogate the responsibility to personally 
decide the case pending before the court. No communication respecting a pending or impending proceeding shall 
occur between the trial judge and an appellate court unless a copy of any written communication or the substance 
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of any oral communication is provided to all parties. A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on 
the law applicable to a proceeding before the court if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted 
and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond. A judge may, with the 
consent of the parties either in writing or on the record, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an 
effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly. 
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any public comment that 
might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that 
might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. A judge should require similar abstention on the part of 
court personnel subject to judicial direction and control. This Canon does not prohibit a judge from making public 
statements in the course of official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court. 
This Canon does not apply to proceedings in which a judge is a litigant in a personal capacity. 
(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict other than in a court order or opinion in a 
proceeding but may express appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial system and the community. 
(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for purposes unrelated to judicial duties, information acquired in a judicial 
capacity that is not available to the public. 
C. Administrative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain 
professional competence in judicial administration, and cooperate with other judges and court officials in the 
administration of court business. 
(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to judicial direction and control to observe the 
standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in the 
performance of their official duties. 
(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of other judges should take reasonable 
measures to assure the prompt disposition of matters before them and the proper performance of their other judicial 
responsibilities. 
(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments, shall exercise the power of appointment impartially and on 
the basis of merit, and shall avoid nepotism and favoritism. A judge shall not approve compensation of appointees 
beyond the fair value of services rendered. 
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities. A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a 
judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware. This section does not apply to 
information generated and communicated under the policies of the Judicial Performance Evaluation Program. 
£. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, including but not limited to instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias 
involving an issue in a case, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; 
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(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, had practiced law with a lawyer who had 
served in the matter at the time of their association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness 
concerning it; 
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever 
residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in 
the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or has any other more than de minimis interest 
that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the 
spouse of such a person: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the 
proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. 
(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests, and should make a 
reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse and minor children 
residing in the judge's household. 
F. Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3E may disclose the basis of the 
judge's disqualification and ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether 
to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for disqualification other than personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge 
need not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding. 
The agreement shall be entered on the record, or if written, filed in the case file. 
[Amended effective April 1, 1997.] 
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(Cite as: 1999 WL 33292465 (D.Utah)) 
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Motions, Pleadings and Filings 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, D. Utah, Central 
Division. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiffs), 
v. 
Cesar FIGUEROA, et al, Defendant(s). 
No. 99-CR-121 W. 
Nov. 30, 1999. 
Rebecca C. Hyde, Esq., Salt Lake City. 
Barbara Bearnson, AUSA, Salt Lake City. 
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 
BOYCE, Magistrate J. 
*1 Defendant, Cesar Figueroa, has made a motion 
to suppress a statement he made in the Los Angeles 
County Jail on April 28, 1999 (File Entry # 68). 
Defendant Figueroa contends any statement he 
made was involuntary and that he did not waive his 
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). 
The case was referred to the magistrate judge under 
28 USC § 636(b)(1)(B). Hearings were held on the 
motion to suppress and this report and 
recommendation is submitted pursuant to the 
reference on the defendant Figueroa's motion to 
suppress. 
Evidence 
Detective Steve Cheever of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department, robbery squad, testified that he 
was investigating the defendant Figueroa and others 
about robberies in Salt Lake City [FN1] (Tr. p. 4). 
On February 8, 1999, Cheever was aware there was 
a fugitive warrant for Figueroa. He was arrested in 
California on April 26, 1999 (Tr. pp. 4-5). 
FN1. Cheever's testimony was given on 
July 9, 1999. 
Officer Cheever went to California with FBI Agent 
Mike Dupler and they saw a defendant who was 
being held by California authorities on state charges 
(Tr. p. 5). Defendant had been arrested on a federal 
unlawful flight warrant (18 USC § 1073) for state 
charges. The Attorney General had not authorized a 
prosecution under 18 USC § 1073 (Tr. p. 7). 
The officers went to the area where defendant was 
being held and asked to interview him. The 
interview occurred in a small room. Defendant was 
given his Miranda rights at 8:51. Cheever asked 
most of the questions. This was on April 28, 1999 
(Tr. p. 8). Cheever asked the questions and Dupler 
was mostly a witness, although he did participate in 
questioning and discussion with defendant. The 
defendant was not intoxicated and spoke English. 
The officer said there were a lot of cases that the 
officer wanted to talk about and Cheever wanted to 
get the defendant's side of the story (Tr. p. 9). 
The defendant's Miranda [FN2] rights were read 
to him from a form. Each right was explained and 
the defendant was asked if he understood. He said 
"yeah" and nodded. The officer then said having the 
rights in mind did defendant wish to talk, the 
defendant said "yeah" again and nodded (Tr. p. 10). 
Defendant was told he was not going to be tricked. 
Exhibit 1 is the Miranda waiver form presented to 
Figueroa (Id.). The form was read to defendant and 
each box checked as read. The defendant indicated 
a willingness to speak and signed the waiver form 
(Tr. pp. 11-12). At no time during the interview did 
the defendant change his mind (Tr. p. 13). 
FN2. Miranda v. Arizona, 324 U.S. 436 
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The defendant was then interviewed about several 
robberies (Id.) (Tr. pp. 13-16). At one point the 
officer used a tape recorder during the interview 
(Tr. pp. 16-17). This was for a recap of what 
defendant had previously said (Tr. p. 17, Exhibit 2). 
Exhibit 3 (Tr. p. 20) is a transcript of the recording 
and the showing from exhibits 2 and 3 is that it was 
a mere question and answer interview with no 
threats or promises. It also shows defendant 
understood the questions and responded fully in 
English (See Tr.p.19). No threats were made during 
the interview and defendant never asked for the 
interview to stop nor did he request an attorney 
during the recorded interview period (Tr. p. 21). 
Defendant was not intoxicated or undergoing 
withdrawal from drugs. Defendant was compliant 
and submissive (Tr. p. 22). 
*2 The defendant had been in the custody of state 
authorities over 48 hours when the interview took 
place (Tr. p. 23). Officer Cheever nor Agent Dupler 
wore a sidearm and defendant was not in handcuffs 
(Tr. p. 24). Before the interview, Officer Cheever 
told Figueroa there were a number of cases that the 
officers needed to talk to him about. The officer had 
no recollection of mentioning that others had 
incriminated the defendant or that his mother had 
identified him from a video tape of the ABC 
robbery (Tr. p. 29). The officer never told 
defendant that there were fingerprints that placed 
him at the robberies (Id.). Defendant was not told 
that he could get a lawyer in Salt Lake City and 
would not need one at the California interview (Tr. 
p. 30). 
Agent Dupler did mention to defendant the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines, apparently at the end 
of the interview (Tr. p. 31). That was not recorded 
(Id.). Cheever told defendant the judge makes the 
decision on what happened to defendant and he 
needs both sides of the story (Tr. p. 33). He told 
defendant it was up to him whether he talked or not 
(Id.). Defendant was arrested about 10:00 p .m. on 
April 26th, the interrogation took place on April 
28th at 8:51 a.m. 48 hours had not expired. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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Special Agent Michael Dupler, FBI, testified that 
he accompanied Officer Cheever to Los Angeles to 
interview Cesar Figueroa (Tr. p. 37). FBI records 
showed defendant was arrested April 26, 1999 at 
3:45 p.m. in Pomona, California. The interview 
took place at the Los Angeles County Jail (Tr. p. 
38). Before the interview Detective Cheever asked 
how defendant was being treated. Cheever was the 
main interviewer (Id.). Exhibit I, the Miranda 
warning was read to defendant. Each right was read 
and as defendant acknowledged it, the box on the 
form pertaining to that right was checked (Tr. p. 39). 
The interview was very relaxed (Tr. p. 40). 
Defendant was alert and coherent, the interview 
started before 9:00 a.m. Defendant said nothing 
about wanting an attorney. He said he would take 
responsibility for what he did but not for what he 
did not do. He did not invoke a right to silence (Tr. 
p. 41). 
Dupler did speak to defendant about federal 
sentencing issues (Id .). Dupler told defendant he 
was being charged under the Hobbs Act. This was 
somewhere in the middle of the interview (Tr. p. 
42). Dupler apparently said all the charges would be 
rolled under one complaint. He didn't discover until 
later that was not the case (Id.). 
As to the sentencing guidelines, Dupler said, 
I explained to Mr. Figueroa that if he were ever 
convicted and guilty of a federal crime that a 
Judge is given a sentencing guidelines of a high 
and a low based on several variables, his criminal 
history, the crimes and different factors that he 
would have to sentence an individual in that high 
and low area of months. 
Nothing was said about not providing an attorney 
in Los Angeles rather than Salt Lake City (Tr. pp. 
43-44). Dupler told defendant the maximum Hobbs 
Act sentencing was 125 years [FN3] but that was 
not necessarily what defendant would be sentenced 
to (Tr. p. 44). Dupler also said cooperation would 
be a factor that would be considered in a sentence. 
He did not mention it with regard to a confession. 
The agent did mention to defendant taking 
"responsibility" for his actions (Tr. pp. 45-46). 
Defendant was told that if he was convicted the 
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judge would take into consideration on the sentence 
if the defendant took responsibility (Tr. p. 46). The 
Agent did not say it would help defendant, but it 
would be taken into consideration by the judge in 
sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and 
could lower defendant's sentence based on 
acceptance of responsibility (Tr. p. 47). The agent 
never said by what range the sentence could be 
lowered, but explained a point system applied and 
the sentence score could be lowered by 2 points (Tr. 
p. 47). No number of years was mentioned (Tr. p. 
48). 
FN3. The Hobbs Act, 18 USC § 1951, 
carries a twenty year maximum on each 
count. Defendant is charged in the 
indictment with eight counts of violation of 
the Hobbs Act, along with other 18 USC § 
924(c) offenses and one count under 18 
USC § 2113. The Hobbs Act counts have a 
maximum statutory sentence of 160 years. 
The § 924(c) counts would add more time. 
*3 Defendant Cesar Figueroa testified. [FN4] The 
defendant said he was arrested in Pomona and had 
been in custody about a week before the interview 
(Tr. p. 3). Mien Detective Cheever interviewed 
defendant, his Miranda rights were read to him and 
he signed the advice and waiver form (Exhibit 2, 
(Tr. p. 4). Defendant asked if he could get an 
attorney and was told by Cheever that he wouldn't 
get one then, but would when he went to Utah. 
Cheever said it was best for defendant to talk at that 
time, that things would go better (Tr. p. 5). This was 
before the waiver was signed (Id.). 
FN4. This was on July 13, 1999. The 
reference are to the transcript of that date. 
At some point Agent Dupler mentioned the federal 
sentencing guidelines. He told defendant the 
maximum sentence could be 125 years, and said if 
he pled guilty his points would drop and he could 
get 10 to 15 years (Tr, p. 6). Defendant thought he 
would get less time if he talked (Tr. p. 7). "Points" 
under the guidelines were discussed but defendant 
didn't understand (Tr. p. 7). 
Defendant was not certain when he was arrested 
(Tr. p. 8). The following morning he was moved to 
Los Angeles County Jail (Tr. p. 9). He thought the 
arrest was for a traffic warrant (Tr. pp. 10-11). He 
was told he could get 125 years and he thought it 
was best for him to talk to the police, and 
codefendants were already taking deals (Tr. p. 11). 
He was shown pictures and said his mother and 
sister had identified him and that it was best to 
plead and work with them (Tr. p. 11). He was fully 
informed of his Miranda rights (Tr. pp. 11-12). 
When he asked for an attorney he was told it was 
best for him to work with the officers (Tr. p. 12). 
Defendant read through the rights form, it was not 
read to him (Tr. p. 12). The officer did not tell 
defendant he had the right to remain silent (Tr. p. 
13). Cheever didn't give defendant an option to 
remain silent, he was told to cooperate or if he went 
to trial he could get the maximum sentence (Tr. pp. 
13-14). Dupler's statement about a sentence 
occurred at the beginning, that's why defendant 
started talking because the 125 year sentence was 
mentioned (Tr. p. 14). Defendant did not ask for an 
attorney when the tape recorder was on, because of 
the prior refusal to give him one (Tr. p. 15). 
Defendant was not under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol at the interview (Tr. p. 17). 
Agent Dupler testified as a rebuttal witness (Tr. p. 
19). He said he first spoke to defendant about the 
sentencing guidelines in the middle or middle end 
of the interview (Tr. p. 19). It came up when 
defendant asked about how many aggravated 
robbery counts he was facing in state court (Tr. p. 
20). There was an outstanding federal Hobbs Act 
indictment for defendant but he had not been 
arrested on it. The Agent explained the Hobbs Act 
and said he thought the maximum penalty was 125 
years, but the Agent said he would have to double 
check on it (Tr. pp. 20-21). The Agent spoke about 
the high and low sentencing range and a sentence 
imposed within the range. After defendant waived 
his rights and spoke about taking responsibility for 
his offenses but not others, the agent mentioned 
acceptance of responsibility under the federal 
sentencing guidelines and a possible two point 
benefit (Tr. p. 22). The subject came up when the 
maximum sentence was discussed (Tr. p. 23). There 
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was no statement that defendant ought to cooperate, 
nor was 10 to 15 years mentioned (Tr. pp. 23-24). 
*4 Defendant never said anything about an attorney 
or an attorney in Utah (Tr. pp. 24-25). Defendant 
was not told that if he talked he would get 2 points 
off (Tr. p. 26). The defendant was not told that 
acceptance of responsibility would minimize his 
sentence only that the judge would take that into 
account (Tr. p. 29). 
Detective Cheever further testified (Tr. p. 32). He 
said he read the Miranda form to the defendant 
word for word and checked off each box on the 
form. Defendant didn't read it. Nothing was said by 
defendant about an attorney (Tr. p. 33). Defendant, 
during the interview, was told that persons had 
identified him from photographs (Tr. p. 34). The 
photographs were not shown to defendant although 
the officer had some photographs (Tr. pp. 34-35). 
Photos were discussed. Detective Cheever was 
aware that defendant had been indicted by a federal 
grand jury (Tr. p. 35). The officer did not mislead 
defendant as to what evidence had been developed 
(Tr.p.36). 
Based on the above evidence the court enters the 
following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. The defendant Cesar Figueroa was arrested on 
April 26, 1999 in California on a federal fugitive 
warrant under 18 USC § 1703 based on a charge in 
the State of Utah for robbery. The Attorney General 
did not authorize prosecution on the fugitive charge. 
Defendant was arrested in Pomona, California and 
held by California as a fugitive for Utah authorities. 
Defendant was transferred to the Los Angeles 
County Jail where he was held on April 28, 1999. 
Defendant was arrested on April 26th at 3:45 p.m. 
in Pomona. He was later interrogated by Officer 
Steve Cheever of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department, who was the head interrogator, and 
Special Agent Michael Dupler of the FBI. This 
interrogation took place on April 28, 1999 at 8:51 
a.m. in a room at the Los Angeles County Jail. 
There was an outstanding federal indictment against 
defendant in Utah on the Hobbs Act (18 USC § 
1951) and other charges, but defendant had not 
been arrested on the indictment and was not told 
about it. The defendant had not been taken before a 
magistrate and did not have counsel at the time of 
the interview. 
2. Before the defendant's interview, Officer 
Cheever and Agent Dupler identified themselves, 
Cheever told defendant that the officer wanted to 
talk to defendant abut robberies in Salt Lake City 
and to get his side of the story. The defendant was 
not intoxicated, spoke and understood English, and 
was not intimidated. The interview was relaxed. 
Officer Cheever said there were a lot of cases he 
wanted to talk about. 
3. Officer Cheever then read a Miranda warning to 
the defendant from a Miranda form. As each right 
was read the defendant said he understood and 
Officer Cheever checked the specific warning right 
on the form. The defendant did not read the form 
himself. After advising the defendant of each right, 
Cheever asked defendant if, having in mind the 
rights of which he had been advised, did he wish to 
talk with officers and defendant nodded his head 
and said "yeah" and also said at one point he would 
take responsibility for what he did but not for what 
he did not do. Defendant was told he was not going 
to be tricked. Defendant signed the waiver form 
after again affirming he would speak. 
*5 4. Defendant did not at anytime ask for counsel 
nor request to remain silent. He was not told that he 
didn't need counsel in California at the interview 
and could get counsel in Utah after signing the 
waiver form. Defendant made statements about 
robberies in Utah. Officer Cheever did tell the 
defendant that he had surveillance photos and the 
defendant had been identified as the person in the 
photos. The photos were never shown to defendant 
and no false statement was made about the photos. 
This portion of the interview was not recorded. 
5. During the interview, the defendant asked about 
the penalties for aggravated robbery, the state 
robbery charges. Agent Dupler informed defendant 
he was to be charged under the federal Hobbs Act 
in a single large charge. He was actually charged in 
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several counts. Agent Dupler advised defendant that 
the maximum penalty for the charges the agent 
believed was 125 years but he would have to check 
on that. The maximum penalty for the Hobbs Act 
charges in the indictment is actually more than that. 
The agent said there was a high and low sentencing 
range. No specific sentence was mentioned. 
Acceptance of responsibility under the federal 
sentencing guidelines was mentioned. These were 
matters of information and they were not threats or 
promises. Defendant was told acceptance of 
responsibility would be a matter for the judge. No 
mention was made as to any particular sentencing 
range. No threats, promises, or indication that 
cooperation in making a statement would reduce 
defendant's sentence, was made to defendant. 
6. After defendant made his oral statement to 
Officer Cheever, Cheever took a tape recorder to 
make a summary of what defendant had previously 
said. A recorded statement was taken from 
defendant. He was not threatened or promised 
anything for the statement. The statement was 
voluntary and at no time did defendant ask for 
counsel or to remain silent. The statement was a 
summary of what defendant had previously said. 
Discussion 
The defendant contends his statement to Officer 
Cheever and Agent Dupler should be suppressed 
because: (1) the defendant, after receiving a 
Miranda warning, requested counsel and was told 
he would not need counsel in California and could 
get counsel in Utah and (2) the statement given by 
defendant to Officer Cheever and Agent Dupler was 
involuntary. 
Miranda 
The defendant's contention that his statement 
should be suppressed because after being given a 
Miranda warning and requesting counsel, 
interrogation continued, is without merit. Of course, 
if a suspect is given a proper Miranda warning, as 
in this case, and waives his rights, but thereafter 
makes an unequivocal request for counsel, 
interrogation must cease. Davis v.. United States, 
512 U.S. 452 (1994). If after the warning is given, 
the suspect, before waiving his rights, requests 
counsel, no further interrogation can take place. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444-45; Smith v. 
Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100 (1984). 
*6 However, in this case, the defendant expressly 
gave a written and oral waiver of his Miranda 
rights, including the right to counsel. At no time did 
defendant request or mention counsel. There was a 
proper waiver, by defendant, of the right to counsel 
and no later invocation of such right. Therefore, 
there was no Miranda violation. 
Voluntariness of Defendant's Confession 
The defendant contends that his confession was 
involuntary because of misrepresentation as to the 
charges and promises of leniency made in exchange 
for defendant's cooperation. 
The defendant asserts defendant had been in 
custody over 48 hours. He had not. He had been 
arrested, was in state custody, and had been in 
custody 41 hours when the interview commenced. 
The period was within that allowed under Riverside 
County v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). See 
also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Also 
because defendant was not in federal custody, the 
time frame under 18 USC § 3501(c) is inapplicable. 
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 571 U.S. 350 
(1994). Finally, defendant in his testimony lied as to 
the period he had been in custody, but did not assert 
that it affected his decision to speak. The issue is 
still one of voluntariness. United States v. Glover, 
104 F.3d 1570 (10th Cir.1997). 
The defendant states the room where the interview 
occurred was small. It was estimated at 10' by 12', 
but this is the size of many functional rooms and 
offices. The defendant has not shown how this 
affected him. This assertion is grasping at straws. 
See United States v. Buckley, 4 F.3d 552, 560 (7th 
Cir.1993). 
Defendant asserts he was told he would only face 
one Hobbs Act charge. This is not correct. Agent 
Dupler told defendant that all the Hobbs Act 
violations would be in a single charge. This was 
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erroneous [FN5] and Dupler admitted he was 
mistaken, however, there is no evidence it had any 
influence on defendant. The form of the charging 
document was simply immaterial because it was 
plain to the defendant that he would have to answer 
to the various robberies. 
FN5. This underscores the admonition that 
interrogators should not speculate about 
what they don't know. 
There is no evidence this was of any importance to 
him or affected his decision to give a statement. 
The defendant contends Dupler's erroneous 
statement that the maximum sentence for the Hobbs 
Act violations was 125 years, effected the 
defendant. Actually, the maximum sentence was 
substantially more if all the counts of the indictment 
were added together. The agent also said he was not 
certain and would have to "check on it." The 
statement was not made as a threat, but in response 
to a question defendant asked about how many 
aggravated robbery charges he was facing. [FN6] 
Advising a defendant as to penalties applicable to 
the offense under investigation is not improper 
coercion United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 752, 
53 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Mendoza, 85 
F.3d 1347, 1350 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. 
Scurlock, 52 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir.1995); United 
States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th 
Cir.1978); Hawkins v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1132, 
1139-41 (5th Cir.1988); United States v. Jones, 32 
F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. 
Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir.1993) 
(confession not rendered involuntary by agents 
informing defendant of potential penalty for the 
crime he was suspected of). In addition, Agent 
Dupler indicated sentencing guidelines would be 
used to calculate a sentencing range. No specific 
sentence or range was mentioned. The conduct of 
Agent Dupler discussing penalties may have been 
unwise, but it did not make the defendant's 
confession involuntary. 
FN6. Aggravated robbery, under Utah law, 
is a first degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302(2), and is punishable by five 
years to life with an additional penalty if a 
firearm is used, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203(1). 
*7 Defendant contends there was a promise of 
leniency in exchange for cooperation. The court has 
found that no promise of leniency or reduced 
sentence was made in exchange for a statement. A 
promise of leniency is relevant to the issue of 
voluntariness of a confession. Clanton v. Cooper, 
129 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir.1997). However, 
advising a suspect that leniency would be 
recommended if the suspect is cooperative will 
usually not render a confession involuntary United 
States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 407 (1st Cir.1998); 
United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1582 (10th 
Cir.1997); United States v. Ruggles, 70 F.3d 262, 
265-66 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Rutledge, 
900 F.2d 1127, 1130 (7th Cir.1990); United States 
v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 608 (9th Cir.1990); 
Williams v. Johnson, 845 F.2d 906 (11th Cir.1988). 
In this case, there was no promise of leniency, nor 
even an indication of a recommendation. The only 
reference to any benefit from cooperation was the 
reference by Agent Dupler to the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines point credit a defendant 
might receive if he accepted responsibility. The 
Agent advised defendant it was up to the judge. 
Advice on the sentencing benefit as to acceptance 
of responsibility is not improper. The Supreme 
Court has recognized that confession is a legitimate 
factor to consider in imposing a sentence. Roberts v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980). A confession is 
also a legitimate factor to be considered in imposing 
sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines 
United States v. Chee, 110 F.3d 1489, 1494 (9th 
Cir.1997); United States v. McKinney, 15 F.3d 849, 
854 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Rogers, 972 
F.2d 489 (2d Cir.1992). See circumstances in 
United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528 (10th 
Cir.1997); United States v. Portillo-Valenzuela, 20 
F.3d 393, 394 (10th Cir.1994); United States v. 
Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1449 (10th Cir.1995). 
The Agent did not make a promise. He gave 
reasonable advice. Acceptance of responsibility is 
something a suspect might rationally consider in 
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determining to make a statement. It does not render 
a confession involuntary. See United States v. 
Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979 (10th Cir.1990) 
(anticipation of acceptance of responsibility credit 
did not make involuntary a statement to a probation 
officer, as to greater involvement in the offense). 
This court has expressly held that an FBI agent's 
referring to the acceptance of responsibility 
guideline in an interrogation of a bank robbery 
suspect was not improper. United States v. Scott, 
96-CR-282 B (D.Utah 1997); United States v. 
Jiminez, # 98-CR-290 B (D.Utah 1999). 
In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) 
, discussing the issue of a challenge to a confession 
based on voluntariness said: 
We hold that coercive police activity is a 
necessary predicate to the finding that a 
confession is not "voluntary" within the meaning 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. [FN7] 
FN7. The same standard applies under the 
Fifth Amendment in this case. 
*8 A statement is involuntary if "the government's 
conduct cause[d] the [person's] will to be 
overborne and his 'capacity for self-determination 
critically impaired" ', United States v. Gonzales, 
164 F.3d 1285, (10th Cir.1999); United States v. 
McCullah, 16 F.3d 1087, 1100 (10th Cir.1996). 
This is to be determined by the totality of the 
circumstances. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279,285-86(1991). 
In United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219 (10th 
Cir.1998) the court held a defendant's statement, as 
to the commission of a robbery, was voluntary 
where defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, 
no force or threat of force was used and defendant 
was intelligent and capable of understanding his 
statement when reduced to writing. The 
interrogation was noncoercive and not lengthy. The 
court also said the FBI agent did not act improperly 
in advising a suspect that cooperation would be 
brought to the attention of the prosecutor. Id. p. 
223. That is not a promise or improper. United 
States v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778, 780, 783, 84 
(10th Cir.1997); United States v. Lewis, 24 F.3d 79 
(10th Cir.1994); United States v. Garot, 80 .2d 
1241, 1244-45 (10th Cir.1986). 
The facts in this case show that defendant was fully 
advised as to his Miranda rights and signed a 
written waiver. He said he would take responsibility 
for what he did but not what he didn't do, he was 
not threatened or handcuffed. The interview session 
was relaxed. Defendant was not made any promises. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Arizona 
v. Fulminante, supra, the government has 
established by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the confession of defendant was voluntary. [FN8] 
United States v. Nguyen, supra; United States v. 
Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir.1998); United 
States v. Benally, 146 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir.1998); 
United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243 (10th 
Cir.1998); Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299 (10th 
Cir.1998); United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570 
(10th Cir.1997). 
FN8. Also applying the standards of 18 
USC § 3501(a) & (b), the defendant's 
statement is voluntary and admissible. 
Conclusion 
Defendant's motion to suppress should be denied. 
Copies of the foregoing Report and 
Recommendation are being mailed to the parties 
who are hereby notified of their right to object to 
the same. The parties are further notified that they 
must file objections to the Report and 
Recommendation, with the clerk of the court, 
pursuant to 28 USC § 636(b), within ten (10) days 
after receiving it. Failure to file objections may 
constitute a waiver of those objections on 
subsequent appellate review. 
1999 WL 33292465 (D.Utah) 
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